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Decentralized Control Problems with Substitutable Actions
Seyed Mohammad Asghari and Ashutosh Nayyar
Abstract— We consider a decentralized system with multiple
controllers and define substitutability of one controller by
another in open-loop strategies. We explore the implications
of this property on the optimization of closed-loop strategies.
In particular, we focus on the decentralized LQG problem with
substitutable actions. Even though the problem we formulate
does not belong to the known classes of “simpler” decentralized
problems such as partially nested or quadratically invariant
problems, our results show that, under the substitutability
assumption, linear strategies are optimal and we provide a
complete state space characterization of optimal strategies. We
also identify a family of information structures that all give
the same optimal cost as the centralized information structure
under the substitutability assumption. Our results suggest that
open-loop substitutability can work as a counterpart of the
information structure requirements that enable simplification
of decentralized control problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The difficulty of finding optimal strategies in decentralized
control problems has been well-established in the literature
[1], [2], [3]. In general, the optimization of strategies can be
a non-convex problem over infinite dimensional spaces [4].
Even the celebrated linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) model
of centralized control presents difficulties in the decentralized
setting [1], [2], [5]. There has been significant interest
in identifying classes of decentralized control problems
that are more tractable. Information structures of decentral-
ized control problems, which describe what information is
available to which controller, have been closely associated
with their tractability. Problems with partially nested [6] or
stochastically nested information structures [7] and problems
that satisfy quadratic invariance [8] or funnel causality [9]
properties have been identified as “simpler” than the general
decentralized control problems.
In this paper, instead of starting from the information
structure of the problem, we first look at open-loop strategies
under which controllers take actions without any observa-
tions. Stated another way, we start with a trivially simple
information structure: no controller knows anything (except,
of course, the model of the system and the cost objective).
We define a property of open-loop decentralized control,
namely the substitutability of one controller by another,
and explore its implications on optimization of closed-loop
strategies (under which controllers take actions as functions
of their observations). In particular, we focus on the de-
centralized LQG problem with substitutable actions. Even
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though the problem we formulate does not belong to one
of the simpler classes mentioned earlier (partially nested,
quadratic invariant etc.), (i) our results show that linear
strategies are optimal; (ii) we provide a complete state
space characterization of optimal strategies; (iii) we also
identify a family of information structures that all achieve
the same cost as the centralized information structure. Our
results suggest that open-loop substitutability can work as
a counterpart of the information structure requirements that
enable simplification of decentralized control problems.
Our work shares conceptual similarities with the work
on internal quadratic variance [10], [11] which identified
problems that are not quadratically invariant but can still
be reduced to (infinite dimensional) convex programs. In
contrast to this work, we explicitly identify optimal control
strategies.
A. Notation
Uppercase letters denote random variables/vectors and
their corresponding realizations are represented by lowercase
letters. Uppercase letters are also used to denote matrices.
E[·] denotes the expectation of a random variable. When
random variable X is normally distributed with mean µ and
variance Σ, it is shown as X ∼ N (µ,Σ).
For a sequence of column vectors X,Y, Z, ..., the notation
vec(X,Y, Z, ...) denotes vector [X⊺, Y ⊺, Z⊺, ...]⊺. Further-
more, the vector vec(X1, X2, ..., Xt) is denoted by X1:t. The
transpose and Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of matrix A are
denoted by A⊺ and A†, respectively. The identity matrix and
zero vector are denoted by I and 0 respectively and their
dimensions are inferred from the context.
II. SUBSTITUTABLE ACTIONS
We consider a stochastic system with n controllers. The
dynamics of the system are given as:
Xt+1 = f(Xt, U
1
t , . . . , U
n
t ,Wt), t = 1, . . . , T − 1. (1)
where Xt is the state of the system at time t, U it is the action
of controller i at time t and Wt is a random noise variable.
The state takes value in the set X , the control action of the
ith controller takes value in the set U i and the noise Wt
takes value in the set W . We use Ut to denote the vector
vec(U1t , . . . , U
n
t ).
The system operates in discrete time for a horizon T .
At time step t, the system incurs a cost given as a func-
tion of the state and control actions: c(Xt, U1t , . . . , Unt ).
The control objective is to minimize the expected value
of the total cost accumulated over the T time steps:
E[
∑T
t=1 c(Xt, U
1
t , . . . , U
n
t )].
We say that controller i is using open-loop control strategy
if its control actions are a function only of time and not
of any information (observations) obtained from the system.
Otherwise, we say that controller i is using a closed-loop
control strategy. Based on the dynamics and the cost func-
tion, we can define a notion of open-loop substitutability
among controllers.
Definition 1: We say that controller 1 can substitute for
controller 2 in open-loop control if for every u1 ∈ U1, u2 ∈
U2, there exists a control action v1 ∈ U1 for controller 1
such that for all x ∈ X , w ∈ W , ui ∈ U i, i = 3, . . . , n,
f(x, u1, u2, u3, . . . , un, w) = f(x, v1, 0, u3, . . . , un, w),
(2a)
and c(x, u1, u2, u3, . . . , un) = c(x, v1, 0, u3, . . . , un). (2b)
v1 is a function only of u1 and u2, that is, v1 = l1,2(u1, u2),
for some function l1,2. We will call l1,2 the substitution
function for controller 1 and 2.
A similar notion of open-loop substitutability can be defined
for any pair of controllers in the system.
If we are considering only open-loop control strategies for
all controllers and if controller 1 can substitute for controller
2 in open-loop control (as per Definition 1), then there is
no loss of optimality in fixing all actions of controller 2 to
0. This is the intuitive meaning of substitutability — since
controller 1 can substitute for controller 2, controller 2 does
not need to do anything.
The open-loop substitutability property has some closed-
loop implications. Let us denote by Iit the collection of all
observations and past control actions that are available to
controller i at time t. Under a closed-loop strategy, controller
i selects its control action as a function of Iit , that is, U it =
git(I
i
t ). The collection of functions gi := {gi1, gi2, . . . , giT } is
referred to as controller i’s (closed-loop) strategy.
Lemma 1: Suppose that controller 1 can substitute for
controller 2 in open-loop control and that for all time instants
t, I1t ⊇ I
2
t , then for any strategies h1, h2, . . . , hn of n
controllers, there exists strategies g1, g2 for controllers 1 and
2, with g2t (I2t ) = 0 for all t, such that g1, g2, h3, . . . , hn
achieve the same cost as h1, h2, . . . , hn.
Proof: Consider any arbitrary strategies h1, h2, . . . , hn
for the n controllers. Define new strategy for controller 1 as
follows:
g1t (I
1
t ) = l
1,2(h1t (I
1
t ), h
2
t (I
2
t )), (3)
where l1,2 is the substitution function from Definition 1.
Firstly, note that (3) is a valid strategy for controller 1
because I2t ⊆ I1t . If this was not the case, the right hand
side of (3) would be using information that controller 1 may
not have.
The result of the lemma then follows from the observation
that the pair (U1t = g1t (I1t ), U2t = 0) will always have the
same effects on dynamics and cost as (U1t = h1t (I1t ), U2t =
h2t (I
2
t )) because of the substitutability conditions.
The condition I1t ⊇ I2t is necessary for Lemma 1 to hold.
It is easy to construct examples where I1t does not include I2t
and the second controller cannot be restricted to the “always
zero” strategy without losing optimality.
The statement of Lemma 1 can be intuitively interpreted
as follows: The open-loop substitutability of controller 2 by
controller 1 and the fact that controller 1 is better informed
make controller 2 essentially redundant for the purpose of
cost optimization.
Lemma 1 suggests that open-loop substitutability, com-
bined with the information structure of the problem, can have
implications about the closed-loop problem. In the rest of the
paper, we consider a LQG control problem with multiple
controllers and obtain results much sharper than Lemma 1
for such problems.
III. LQG PROBLEM WITH STATE FEEDBACK
A. System Model
We consider a stochastic system with n controllers where
1) The state dynamics are given as
Xt+1 = AXt +BUt +Wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (4)
where Xt,Wt ∈ Rdx and Ut ∈ Rdu .
2) The cost at time t is given as
c(Xt, Ut) = (MXt +NUt)
⊺(MXt +NUt). (5)
3) The initial state X1 and the noise variables Wt, t =
1, . . . , T − 1 are independent and have Gaussian dis-
tributions.
We will make the following assumption about the system.
Assumption 1: Each controller can substitute for any other
controller in open loop control. In other words, for every
vector u = vec(u1, u2, . . . , un), there exist control actions
vi = li(u) for controller i, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
Bu = B


0
.
.
.
vi
.
.
.
0


and Nu = N


0
.
.
.
vi
.
.
.
0


. (6)
Lemma 2: We can write the B and N matrices in terms
of their blocks as
B =
[
B1 . . . Bn
]
,
N =
[
N1 . . . Nn
]
.
If Assumption 1 is true, then vi = Λiu 1 satisfies (6) for
i = 1, . . . , n where
Λi =
[
Bi
N i
]† [
B
N
]
. (7)
1 In the previous version of this work [12], we stated that if Assumption
1 is true, then vi = (Bi)†Bu = (N i)†Nu and (Bi)†B = (N i)†N . This
statement is correct only if Bi and N i are invertible so that (Bi)† =
(Bi)−1 and (N i)† = (N i)−1. However, in general, the statement is
incorrect. The correct expression for vi is vi = Λiu where Λi is as given
by (7).
Proof: The system of equations of (6) is equivalent to
a matrix equation of the form
Pvi = b,where P =
[
Bi
N i
]
, b =
[
B
N
]
u. (8)
The general solution of (8) is vi = P †b + (I − P †P )y for
arbitrary y [13]. By setting y = 0, we have vi = P †b.
An example of a system satisfying Assumption 1 is a two-
controller LQG problem where the dynamics and the cost
are functions only of the sum of the control actions, that is,
(u1t + u2t ). This happens if B1 = B2 and N1 = N2. In this
case, using v1t = v2t = u1t+u2t satisfies (6), which means that
controller 1 can substitute for controller 2 and vice versa.
B. Information Structure
We assume that the state vector Xt consists of n sub-
vectors, that is Xt = vec(X1t , X2t , . . . , Xnt ). X it can be
interpreted as the state of the ith sub-system. We assume a
local state feedback with perfect recall information structure,
that is, the information available to controller i at time t is:
Iit = {X
i
1:t, U
i
1:t−1}, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (9)
Controller i chooses action U it as a function of the informa-
tion available to it. Specifically, for i = 1, . . . , n,
U it = g
i
t(I
i
t ), t = 1, . . . , T. (10)
The collection gi = (gi1, ..., giT ) is called the control strategy
of controller i. The performance of the control strategies g1,
g2, . . . , gn is measured by the expected cost
J (g1, . . . , gn)
= Eg
1,...,gn
[
T∑
t=1
(MXt +NUt)
⊺(MXt +NUt)
]
(11)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint probabil-
ity distribution on (X1:T , U1:T ) induced by the choice of
g1, . . . , gn.
C. Optimal Strategies
The optimization problem is defined as follows.
Problem 1: For the model described in section III-A and
III-B, find control strategies g1, . . . , gn for the n controllers
that minimize the expected cost given by (11).
Remark 1: Since we have not imposed any constraints
on the matrices A and B in system dynamics, Problem 1
may not have partially nested information structure. Thus,
we cannot guarantee, at this point, the optimality of linear
control strategies for this problem.
In addition to the decentralized information structure de-
scribed above, we will also consider the centralized informa-
tion structure where all controllers have access to the entire
state and action history.
Problem 2: For the model described in section III-A,
assume that the information available to each controller is,
I˜t = {X1:t, U1:t−1}. (12)
Controller i chooses its action according to strategy hi =
(hi1, . . . , h
i
T ),
U it = h
i
t(I˜t).
The objective is to select controller strategies that minimize
J (h1, . . . , hn)
= Eh
1,...,hn
[
T∑
t=1
(MXt +NUt)
⊺(MXt +NUt)
]
(13)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint probabil-
ity distribution on (X1:T , U1:T ) induced by the choice of
h1, . . . , hn.
D. Main results
In this section, we will show that we can construct optimal
strategies in Problem 1 from the optimal control strategies
of the centralized problem (Problem 2). We start with the
following observations.
Lemma 3: 1) The optimal cost in Problem 2 (with
centralized information structure) is a lower bound
on the optimal cost in Problem 1 (with decentralized
information structure).
2) The optimal strategies in Problem 2 are linear func-
tions of the state, that is, the control vector Ut =
vec(U1t , . . . , U
n
t ) is given as
Ut = KtXt = [K
1
t . . .K
n
t ]Xt
= K1tX
1
t + . . .+K
n
t X
n
t . (14)
Kt is the centralized gain matrix and Kit is its ith
block.
We can now state our main result for the state feedback
case.
Theorem 1: The optimal control strategies in Problem 1
are given as
U it = l
i
t(K
i
tX
i
t) = Λ
iKitX
i
t , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (15)
where Λi is given by (7) and Kit is the ith block of
the centralized gain matrix in (14). Moreover, the optimal
strategies in Problem 1 achieve the same cost as the optimal
strategies in Problem 2.
Proof Outline: Firstly, observe that the strategies given
by (15) are valid control strategies under the information
structure of Problem 1. The optimal control vector Ut under
the centralized strategy is a superposition of terms of the
form KitX it . Note that the term KitX it consists of n sub-
vectors (one corresponding to each controller’s action).
KitX
i
t =


Ki1t
Ki2t
.
.
.
Kint

X it .
Such a control vector cannot be implemented in the de-
centralized information structure since it requires each con-
troller to have access to X it . We now exploit the open
loop substitutability of the problem to state that the vector
vec(0, . . . , lit(K
i
tX
i
t), . . . , 0) will have the same effect as
KitX
i
t . This allows us to construct a decentralized strategy
with the same performance as the centralized one. We
provide a detailed proof for the more general case of the
output feedback problem in the next section.
We can also derive the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: For the model described in section III-A,
consider any information structure under which the infor-
mation of controller i at time t, Iˆit , satisfies
{X it} ⊆ Iˆ
i
t ⊆ {X1:t, U1:t−1},
for all i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T . Then, the optimal
strategies in this information structure are the same as in
Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 identifies memoryless local state feedback as
the minimal information structure that achieves the optimal
centralized cost. In other words, it describes the minimal
communication and memory requirements for controllers to
achieve the optimal centralized cost.
IV. LQG PROBLEM WITH OUTPUT FEEDBACK
A. System Model
We consider the system model described in section III-A
and assume that each controller makes a noisy observation
of the system state given as
Y it = C
iXt + V
i
t , i = 1, . . . , n. (16)
Combining (16) for all controllers gives:
Yt =


C1
C2
.
.
.
Cn

Xt + Vt, (17)
where Yt denotes vec(Y 1t , Y 2t , . . . , Y nt ) and Vt denotes
vec(V 1t , V
2
t , . . . , V
n
t ). The initial state X1 and the noise
variables Wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, and Vt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
are mutually independent and jointly Gaussian with the
following probability distributions:
X1 ∼ N (0,Σx), Wt ∼ N (0,Σw), Vt ∼ N (0,Σv).
The information available to the ith controller at time t is:
Iit = {Y
i
1:t, U
i
1:t−1} i = 1, . . . , n. (18)
Each controller i, chooses its action U it according to U it =
git(I
i
t ) and the performance of the control strategies of all
controllers, (g1, . . . , gn), is measured by (11).
The optimization problem is defined as follows.
Problem 3: For the model described above, find control
strategies g1, . . . , gn for the n controllers that minimize the
expected cost given by (11).
In addition to the decentralized information structure de-
scribed above, we will also consider the centralized informa-
tion structure and the corresponding strategy optimization.
Problem 4: For the model described above, assume that
the information available to each controller is
I˜t = {Y1:t, U1:t−1}. (19)
Controller i chooses its action according to strategy U it =
hit(I˜t). The objective is to select control strategies that
minimize (13).
The following lemma follows directly from the problem
descriptions above and well-known results for the centralized
LQG problem with output feedback [14].
Lemma 4: 1) The optimal cost in Problem 4 (with
centralized information structure) is a lower bound
on the optimal cost in Problem 3 (with decentralized
information structure).
2) The optimal strategies in Problem 4 have the form
of Ut = KtZt where Zt = E(Xt|I˜t). Zt evolves
according to the following equations:
Z1 = L1Y1
Zt+1 = (I − Lt+1C)(AZt +BUt) + Lt+1Yt+1.
(20)
We define Σt = E[(Xt − Zt)(Xt − Zt)⊺|I˜t] which
satisfies the following update equations:
Σ1 = (I − L1C)Σx
Σt+1 = (I − Lt+1C)(AΣtA
⊺ +Σw). (21)
The matrices L1, . . . , LT in (20) and (21) satisfy the
forward recursion:
L1 = Σ1C
⊺[CΣ1C
⊺ +Σv]
−1
Lt+1 =
(AΣtA
⊺ +Σw)C
⊺[C(AΣtA
⊺ +Σw)C
⊺ +Σv]
−1.
(22)
B. Main results
In this section, we show that it is possible to construct
optimal strategies in Problem 3 from the optimal control
strategy of Problem 4.
Theorem 2: Consider Problems 3 and 4, and consider the
optimal strategy, Ut = KtZt, of Problem 4, where Kt and
Zt are as defined in Lemma 4. We write Lt+1 of Lemma 4
as Lt+1 =
[
L1t+1 L
2
t+1 . . . L
n
t+1
]
. The optimal control
strategies of Problem 3 can be written as
U it = Λ
iKtS
i
t (23)
where Λi is given by (7) and Sit satisfies the following update
equations:
Si1 = L
i
1Y
i
1
Sit+1 = (I − Lt+1C)(AS
i
t +B
iU it ) + L
i
t+1Y
i
t+1. (24)
Moreover, the optimal strategies in Problem 3 achieve the
same cost as the optimal strategies in Problem 4.
Observe that the strategies given by (23) and (24) are
valid control strategies under the information structure of
Problem 3 because they depend only on Y i1:t, U i1:t−1 which
are included in Iit . The states Sit defined in (24) are related
to the centralized estimate Zt by the following result.
Lemma 5: The centralized state estimate Zt and the states
Sit defined in (24) satisfy the following equation:
Zt =
n∑
i=1
Sit . (25)
Proof: We prove the result by induction. For t = 1,
from (20), we have Z1 = L1Y1 and according to (24),
n∑
i=1
Si1 = L
1
1Y
1
1 + L
2
1Y
2
1 + ...+ L
n
1Y
n
1 = L1Y1. (26)
Now assume that Zt =
∑n
i=1 S
i
t . We need to show that
Zt+1 =
∑n
i=1 S
i
t+1. From (20), it follows that
Zt+1 = (I − Lt+1C)(AZt +BUt) + Lt+1Yt+1. (27)
From (24), we have
n∑
i=1
Sit+1 =
n∑
i=1
[(I − Lt+1C)(AS
i
t +B
iU it ) + L
i
t+1Y
i
t+1]
= (I − Lt+1C)(A
n∑
i=1
Sit +
n∑
i=1
BiU it ) +
n∑
i=1
Lit+1Y
i
t+1]
= (I − Lt+1C)(AZt +BUt) + Lt+1Yt+1. (28)
Therefore, Zt+1 =
∑n
i=1 S
i
t+1.
Remark 2: For the case of state feedback, it can be easily
shown that Sit = vec(0, . . . , X it , . . . , 0).
The following result is an immediate consequence of
Theorem 2.
Corollary 2: For the model described in section IV-A,
consider any information structure under which the infor-
mation of controller i at time t, Iˆit , satisfies
{Y i1:t, U
i
1:t−1} ⊆ Iˆ
i
t ⊆ {Y1:t, U1:t−1},
for all i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T . Then, the optimal
strategies in this information structure are the same as in
Theorem 2.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
For notational conveniences, we will describe the proof
for n = 2. If Ut = KtZt is the optimal control strategy of
Problem 4, then from Lemma 5, we have:
Ut = KtZt = Kt(S
1
t + S
2
t ) (29)
We claim that the decentralized control strategies defined in
Theorem 2, that is
Ut =
[
U1t
U2t
]
=
[
Λ1KtS
1
t
Λ2KtS
2
t
]
, (30)
yield the same expected cost as the optimal centralized
control strategies Ut = KtZt.
To establish the above claim, we define cost-to-go func-
tions under the optimal centralized strategy and the strategies
defined in Theorem 2. These functions, denoted by Vr(z)
and Vˆr(z, s1, s2) for r = T, T − 1, . . . , 1, are defined as
follows:
Vr(z) =
E
[ T∑
t=r
(MXt +NUt)
⊺(MXt +NUt)|Zr = z, Ur = Krz
]
,
(31)
where Ut is given by (29) for all t, and
Vˆr(z, s
1, s2) =
E
[ T∑
t=r
(MXt +NUt)
⊺(MXt +NUt)|Zr = z, S
1
r = s
1,
S2r = s
2, U1r = Λ
1Krs
1, U2r = Λ
2Krs
2
]
, (32)
where Ut is given by (30) for all t. The function Vˆr(z, s1, s2)
in (32) is defined only for z = s1 + s2; Vˆr(z, s1, s2) is
undefined for z 6= s1 + s2.
We will show that for r = 1, ..., T , Vr(z) =
Vˆr(z, s
1, s2) ∀z, s1, s2 ∈ Rdx such that z = s1 + s2. We
follow a backward induction argument. For r = T , we have,
VT (z) = E[(MXT +NUT )
⊺(MXT +NUT )|ZT = z,
UT = KT z] (33)
VˆT (z, s
1, s2) =
E[(MXT +NUT )
⊺(MXT +NUT )|ZT = z, S
1
T = s
1,
S2T = s
2, U1T = Λ
1KT s
1, U2T = Λ
2KT s
2]. (34)
Since the only difference between (33) and (34) is with
respect to their different control strategies, it suffices to show
that the term NUT is the same under these two control
strategies.
Under control action uT = KT z, we have NuT = NKT z.
Under control actions u1T = Λ1KT s1, u2T = Λ2KT s2, we
have
NuT =
[
N1 N2
]
uT = N
1u1T +N
2u2T
= N1Λ1KT s
1 +N2Λ2KT s
2 (35)
From the substitutability assumption (Assumption 1) and
Lemma 2, for any vector u, Nu = N ili(u) = N iΛiu.
Therefore,
N1Λ1KT s
1 = NKT s
1,
N2Λ2KT s
2 = NKT s
2. (36)
(35) can now be written as,
N1Λ1KT s
1 +N2Λ2KT s
2 = N(KT s
1 +KT s
2) = NKT z
(37)
where the last equality is true because z = s1+s2. Therefore,
VT (z) = VˆT (z, s
1, s2) ∀z, s1, s2 ∈ Rdx such that z =
s1 + s2.
Now, assume that Vk+1(z) =
Vˆk+1(z, s
1, s2) ∀z, s1, s2 ∈ Rdx such that z = s1+ s2. We
need to show that Vk(z) = Vˆk(z, s1, s2) ∀z, s1, s2 ∈ Rdx
with z = s1 + s2. For this, note that one can use dynamic
programming arguments to write the cost-to-go functions
Vk and Vˆk in terms of instantaneous cost and the next
stage cost-to-go functions:
Vk(z) = E[(MXt +NUt)
⊺(MXt +NUt)|Zk = z, Uk =
Kkz] + E[Vk+1(Zk+1)|Zk = z, Uk = Kkz], (38)
and
Vˆk(z, s
1, s2) =
E[(MXt +NUt)
⊺(MXt +NUt)|Zk = z, S
1
k = s
1,
S2k = s
2, U1k = Λ
1Kks
1, U2k = Λ
2Kks
2]
+ E[Vˆk+1(Zk+1, S
1
k+1, S
2
k+1)|Zk = z, S
1
k = s
1, S2k = s
2,
U1k = Λ
1Kks
1, U2k = Λ
2Kks
2]. (39)
The first expectation on the right hand side of (38) can be
shown to be equal to the first expectation on the right hand
side of (39) by repeating the arguments used at time T . Using
Lemma 4, the second expectation on the right hand side of
(38) can be written as,
E[Vk+1(Zk+1)|Zk = z, Uk = Kkz]
= E[Vk+1
(
(I − Lk+1C)(AZk +BUk)+
Lk+1(CXk+1 + Vk+1)
)
|Zk = z, Uk = Kkz]
= E[Vk+1
(
(I − Lk+1C)(A+BKk)z + Lk+1(CAXk+
CBKkz + CWk + Vk+1)
)
|Zk = z, Uk = Kkz]
= E[Vk+1
(
(A+BKk)z + Lk+1CA(Xk − z)
+ Lk+1(CWk + Vk+1)
)
|Zk = z]. (40)
Furthermore, because of the induction hypothesis, the second
expectation on the right hand side of (39) can be written as,
E[Vˆk+1(Zk+1, S
1
k+1, S
2
k+1)|Zk = z, S
1
k = s
1, S2k = s
2,
U1k = Λ
1Kks
1, U2k = Λ
2Kks
2]
= E[Vk+1(Zk+1)|Zk = z, S
1
k = s
1, S2k = s
2,
U1k = Λ
1Kks
1, U2k = Λ
2Kks
2]. (41)
(41) can be further written as
E[Vk+1
(
(I − Lk+1C)(Az +B
1U1k +B
2U2k )+
Lk+1(CAXk + CB
1U1k + CB
2U2k + CWk + Vk+1)
)
|
Zk = z, S
1
k = s
1, S2k = s
2, U1k = Λ
1Kks
1, U2k = Λ
2Kks
2].
(42)
From the substitutability assumption (Assumption 1) and
Lemma 2, for any vector u, Bu = Bili(u) = BiΛiu.
Therefore,
B1Λ1Kks
1 = BKks
1,
B2Λ2Kks
2 = BKks
2. (43)
(42) can now be written as
E[Vk+1
(
(I − Lk+1C)(Az +BKks
1 +BKks
2)+
Lk+1(CAXk + CBKks
1 + CBKks
2 + CWk + Vk+1)
)
|
Zk = z, S
1
k = s
1, S2k = s
2, U1k = Λ
1Kks
1,
U2k = Λ
2Kks
2] = E[Vk+1
(
(Az +BKkz)+
Lk+1CA(Xk − z) + Lk+1(CWk + Vk+1)
)
|Zk = z]. (44)
(44) is the same as (40). Therefore, Vk(z) =
Vˆk(z, s
1, s2) ∀z, s1, s2 ∈ Rdx such that z = s1 + s2.
Now, the expected cost under the centralized control
strategy, Ut = KtZt, can be written as,
E
[
T∑
t=1
c(Xt,KtZt)
]
= E
[
E
[
T∑
t=1
c(Xt,KtZt)
∣∣∣Z1, U1 = K1Z1
]]
= E[V1(Z1)], (45)
while the expected cost under the decentralized strategies of
Theorem 2 can be written as
E
[
T∑
t=1
c
(
Xt,
[
Λ1KtS
1
t
Λ2KtS
2
t
])]
= E
[
E
[ T∑
t=1
c
(
Xt,
[
Λ1KtS
1
t
Λ2KtS
2
t
]) ∣∣∣Z1, S11 , S21 , U11 =
Λ1K1S
1
1 , U
2
1 = Λ
2K1S
2
1
]]
= E[Vˆ1(Z1, S
1
1 , S
2
1)] (46)
Because V1(z) = Vˆ1(z, s1, s2) ∀z, s1, s2 such that z =
s1 + s2, (45) and (46) are equal. Thus, the decentralized
control strategies of Theorem 2 achieve the same expected
cost as the optimal centralized strategies.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered a decentralized system with multiple con-
trollers and defined a property called substitutability of one
controller by another in open-loop strategies. For the LQG
problem, our results show that, under the substitutability
assumption, linear strategies are optimal and we provide a
complete state space characterization of optimal strategies.
Our results suggest that open-loop substitutability can work
as a counterpart of the information structure requirements
that enable simplification of decentralized control problems.
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